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In Strickland v. Washington,' the Supreme Court articulated a
two-part standard for evaluating a defendant's Sixth Amendment claim
that he did not receive tlie effective assistance of counsel at his criminal trial. To establish constitutional ineffectiveness of trial counsel
under Strickland, a defendant must prove first that he did not receive
reasonably competent assistance, and second, that but for the deficient
performance of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the result
of the proceeding would have been different.2
The Supreme Court has also held that there is a constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal in criminal cases3
However, that right arises out of the Due Process Clause, not the Sixth

1. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
2. Id at 687.
3. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
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A~nendrnent.~
The Court has yet to determine the standard for evaluating claims that the right to effective assistance of appellate counsel has
been denied. Should the Strickland v. Washington Sixth Amendment
test be applied to appellate counsel, or should some other test be applied, for example, a traditional due process test? If Strickland is applied, should it be applied in the same way to appellate counsel as it is
to trial counsel? Every United States Circuit Court of Appeals has
applied the Strickland test to appellate counsel,5 but none has carefully
analyzed the pr~blem.~
Clearly there are significant differences between the functions
performed by trial and appellate counsel that might call for a different
standard.' Additionally, the difference between the trial and appellate
4. Id. at 402-05. See discussion in9a Part IILA.
5. United States v. Victoria, 876 F.2d 1009 (1st Cir. 1989); Abdurrahman v.
Henderson, 897 F.2d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1990); Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1987);
Griffin v. Aiken, 775 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1985); Schwander v. Blackbum, 750 F.2d 494,
501-02 (5th Cir. 1985); Bransford v. Brown, 806 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1986); Gray v. Greer,
800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1986); Blackmon v. White, 825 F.2d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1986); Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501
(10th Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775, 780 (11th Cir. 1984).
6. The Ninth Circuit is the only court to offer any reason for applying the Strickland
standard to appellate counsel. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1989). However, it
offered no analysis of the very complex issue. Thus, in Miller, the court's entire statement
on the subject is as follows:
We review claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel according to the
standard set out in Strickland v. Washington [citation omitted]. United States v.
Birtle [citation omitted]. See also Penson v. Ohio [citation omitted] (holding that
where a defendant has been, actually or constructively denied the assistance of appellate counsel altogether, the Strickland standard does not apply and prejudice is
presumed; the implication is that Strickland does apply where counsel is present
but ineffective).
Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. In United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1986), the
same court offered a different, but equally conclusory and inadequate statement of its reasons. There, it interpreted the Strickland Court's statement that its "principles governing
ineffectiveness claims should apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct
appeal or in motions for a new trial" (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697) to mean that
Strickland's analysis applied to counsel's performance in each of these forums. Birtle, 792
F.2d at 847. It seems clear that this is a misinterpretation, and that the Court was in reality
indicating that its Strickland standard was applicable regardless of which forum was being
used to entertain the claim of ineffective assistance. Whether correct or not however, the
Ninth Circuit did not fully analyze the issue.
7. See infra Parts IV.A.1. and IV.A.2.
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forums might require a different ~tandard.~
For example, the more
important role played by the facts and by the client at trial might call
for a more deferential inquiry into trial counsel's performance than the
inquiry into appellate counsel's perf~rmance.~
Moreover, a finding of
ineffectiveness of trial counsel has a substantially greater impact on
finality than does a finding of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel
because of the greater factual complexity of trial ineffectiveness claims,
the more extensive procedures required to resolve those claims, and the
drastic remedy - reversal of a criminal conviction - required for
ineffectiveness of trial counsel but not for ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel.lo
As this article concludes, under a due process analysis, Strickland's
"reasonable competence" standard" should apply to appellate counsel.
However, the application of that standard in evaluating the performance
of appellate counsel should be substantially different fiom its application to trial counsel. Thus, fiom a functional analysis of the role of
appellate coun~el,'~
"reasonable competence" should require counsel to
perform several basic appellate functions. These include taking appropriate steps to gain access to the appellate court, securing and reviewing the record in the lower court, and performing legal research.I3
With respect to appellate counsel's duty to select effectively the
issues to be raised on appeal, we conclude that Strickland's "reasonable
competence" standard should be applied with much less deference to

8. See discussion inza Part N.B.
9. See discussion inza Part 1V.B.
10. See discus:jion inza Part 1V.B.
11. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. This standard is not without its critics. See, e.g.,
Vivian Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths a Dead
End?, 86 COLUM.L. REV. 9 (1986); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of
"Counsel" in the Skth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433 (1993).
However, critique of that standard is beyond the scope of this article. This article
does not take issue with the reasonable competence standard formulated by the Supreme
Court for evaluating the constitutional effectiveness of trial counsel; it analyzes the application of that standard to appellate counsel.
12. See B N C ~A. Green, Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 80 COLUM.L. REV. 1053 (1980) (applying a functional analysis to the right to
effective assistance of trial counsel).
13. See infra Part V.A.

-
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counsel than that mandated by the Strickland Court. Moreover, because
virtually all federal constitutional evaluation of appellate counsel's
performance occurs in the context of federal habeas corpus review of
state appellate counsel, Strickland's requirement of a showing of prejudice should not be applicable to claims of appellate ineffectiveness.I4
The current practice of finding ineffectiveness only where an omitted
issue would have succeeded in the state appellate courts requires the
federal courts to predict the reviewability and probable disposition of
state law issues in the state courts, a gross federal intrusion into state
process beyond that ordinarily permitted in the operation of the federal
courts' corrective role. This same intrusion could be avoided without
the expenditure of substantial additional judicial resources by remanding a case to the state courts once the federal court determines that the
omitted issue is of sufficient merit to warrant the state court's consideration. Requiring the reviewing federal court to determine whether
there was prejudice in the state courts would conflict with the Supreme
Court's now well-established, restrictive view of the habeaus corpus
court's role in reviewing state conviction^.'^
Part I1 of this article closely examines the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, as it applies to effective assistance of
trial counsel. Part 111 analyzes the constitutional origin and current
status of the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. Part IV
discusses the functional differences between trial and appellate counsel,
the differences in the two forums, and the different effect that a finding of ineffectiveness of counsel at trial or on appeal has on finality.
Part V formulates a standard to govern ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel claims that incorporates Strickland's "reasonable competence"
standard, but applies that standard differently with respect to appellate
counsel. It also rejects Strickland's prejudice requirement.

14. See infa Part V.B.
15. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860 (1993); Brecht v. Abrahamson,
113 S. Ct. 1710, 1717-19 (1993).
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A. Factual Background
In Strickland v. Washington,l6 the Court reviewed a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel during the sentencing phase of a death
penalty case. Washington had gone on a crime spree that included
three murders and several robberies." He surrendered, confessed to
one of the murders, and then, against his lawyer's advice, confessed to
the two others.'' He pled guilty to all charges and rejected his
lawyer's advicr: to request an advisory sentencing jury at the sentencing
phase of the pi:oceeding.19
Counsel did little to prepare for sentencing. He decided instead to
appeal to the sentencing court's well-known favorable disposition toward those defendants who plead guilty." Counse1,met with Washington and spoke by telephone with Washington's wife and mother. However, he did not follow up on this one unsuccessful attempt to meet
with them in person.21 Furthermore, he did not seek out any character
witnesses because of his sense of "hopelessness'' about the case and
because he believed it would be better tactically to rely on the plea
colloquy for facts about Washington's character.22 In essence,
counsel's strategy was to avoid exposing Washington to negative rebuttal proof by declining to put on any proof. Using similar strategy, he
also did not request a probation report because he believed it would

466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id at 67162.
Id at 672.
Id
Id.
Id. at 672-73.
Id at 673. According to the Court, "[tlhat decision reflected trial counsel's sense
of hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of respondent's confessions to the
gruesome crimes." hi It also reflected counsel's decision to rely on the plea colloquy for
such evidence; the colloquy had been sufficient and the decision to forgo the presentation of
additional evidence prevented the State from cross-examining respondent and putting on
psychiatric proof o f its own. Id
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

5

Heinonline - - 97 W. Va. L. Rev. 6 1994-1995

19941

EFFECTNE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE C O W S E L

7

prove more detrimental than helpful.u However, counsel did succeed
in having some evidence excluded that he thought was damaging, including the defendant's criminal rec0rd.2~
Counsel's sentencing strategy was thus to rely on the trial judge's
remarks at the plea proceeding where the judge said that he had great
respect for defendants who own up to their crimes.* Counsel argued:
(1) that Washington's remorse and acceptance of responsibility justified
sparing him from the death penalty; (2) that he had no significant
criminal history; and (3) that he committed the crimes under extreme
mental or emotional stress due to his inability to support his family?6
Nevertheless, the trial judge found several aggravating circumstances
for each of the three murders and no mitigating circumstances. Therefore, the judge sentenced Washington to death on each of the three
counts of murder?'

B. State Appellate and Collateral Proceedings
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the convictions and sentences
on direct appeal?* Washington then sought state collateral relief
claiming, inter alia, that he had been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to investigate and develop
The Circuit Court
character evidence in mitigation of his ~entence.2~
of Dade County denied relief, and the Florida Supreme Court af-

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 673-74.
27. Id. at 675.
28. Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658 @la 1978).
29. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675. This claim was based on counsel's failure to (1)
move for a continuance to prepare for sentence; (2) request a psychiatric rep?% (3) investigate and present character witnesses; (4) seek a presentencing investigation report; (5) present
meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge; and (6) investigate the medical examiner's
reports or cross-examine the medical experts concerning the causes of deaths. Id. at 675.
The respondent submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors and relatives stating that
they would have testified if asked; and a psychiatric report and a psychologist's report stating that he was "chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic dilemma" Id.
at 675-76.
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firmed:'
holding that Washington had "failed . . . to make a prima
facie showing of [either] substantial deficiency or possible prejudice . . . .,931
C. Habeas Corpus Proceedings

A petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus based on ineffective
representation was denied.32 The district court held that although trial
counsel had rnade errors in failing to investigate mitigating evidence
further, Washington had suffered no prejudice since he would have
received a death sentence in any event.33The Fifth Circuit affirmed in
part and vacated in part.34 It formulated a different analysis and standard for judging ineffectiveness claims and remanded the case to the
district court with instructions to apply that standard to the facts.35
Rehearing en banc was

On rehearing en banc, the Eleventh Circuie7 analyzed the case
under an entirely different standard.38 It held that the Sixth Arnendment right to counsel entitles a criminal defendant to "counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circum~tances."~~
The court explicitly recognized
a duty to investigate and noted that "the amount of pretrial investigation that is reasonable defies precise rnea~urement."~'Nevertheless, the
court attempted to establish some guidelines for measuring the scope of
that duty. Thus, the court held that where there is only one plausible
defense, counsel must conduct a "reasonably substantial investigation"
that includes "an independent examination of the facts, circumstances,
30. Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1981).
31. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 676, 678.
32. Id. at 679.
33. Id. at 678-79.
34. Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
35. Id.
36. Washington v. Strickland, 679 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
37. Between the issuance of the panel decision and rehearing en banc, the Eleventh
Circuit was created and retained jurisdiction of the case.
38. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (Former 5th Cir. 1982).
39. Id. at 1250.
40. Id. at 1251.
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pleadings and laws involved."41 If there is more than one plausible
line of defense, counsel should substantially investigate each one before
choosing which one to rely 0n.4~Strategic choices based on such investigation "will seldom if ever" be found ineffe~tive.4~
Failure substantially to investigate each plausible line of defense
may not necessarily be ineffective, although counsel may not exclude
defenses for other than strategic reasons. Limitations of time and money, information fiom the client, and the strength of the prosecution's
case are dl relevant ~onsiderations.~"
Under the Eleventh Circuit's scheme, reasonable assumptions and
reasonable choices made after considering the totality of the circumstances are entitled to substantial deference:' Factors relevant to determining "reasonableness" include: (1) the attorney's experience; (2)
the inconsistency of pursued and abandoned lines of defense; and (3)
the potential for prejudice fiom taking an abandoned line of defen~e."~
With respect to prejudice, the court held that a defendant must
demonstrate that counsel's errors "resulted in actual and substantial
disadvantage to the course of his defense.'*' Upon such a showing,
reversal would be required unless the prosecution demonstrated beyond
a reasonable doubt that counsel's deficient performance was harmless." After articulating this standard, the ~leventhCircuit reversed
and remanded the case to the district court for application of this standard.4' The State petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court to review the Eleventh Circuit's decision, and the petition was granted."

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 1252-53.
Id. at 1254.
Id.
Id. at 1257-58.
Id. at 1255.
Id at 1256-57 n.23.
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1260-62.
Id at 1243.
462 U.S. 1103 (1983).
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D. The Suprerne Court Decision
1. The Majority Opinion

In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor~'.the Supreme Court
reversed." It held that Washington's right to effective assistance of
counsel had not been ~iolated.'~Emphasizing that the underlying purpose of the Sixth Amendment requirement of effective assistance is "to
insure a fair trialTS4 the Court explained that, "the benchmark for
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct
so undermined. the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just re~ult."'~
Rejecting the Eleventh Circuit's formulation of elaborate guidelines
to cover all cases, the court articulated a simple two-part test for ineffectiveness claims.56 First, the defendant must demonstrate that his
attorney's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonablene~s."'~Second., there must be a showing that there existed a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different."s8
As to the fxst prong:' the Court held that the standard for determining an attorney's performance is that of reasonably effective assistance under ccprevailingprofessional norms."60 A defendant must show
51. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion was joined by six justices, including Chief
Justice Burger and .lustices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. In a separate
opinion, Justice Brennan joined the Court's opinion, but dissented from its judgment on the
ground that "the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment!'
StricWand, 466 U.S. at 701. Justice Marshall dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 706. See
discussion infia Par1 II.D.2.
52. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 701.
53. Id at 700-01.
54. Id. at 686.
55. Id
56. Id at 687.
57. Id. at 688.
58. Id at 694.
59. In adopting this standard, the Court relied on its own prior decision in McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), as well as the consensus of the federal courts.
60. 466 U.S. at 688.
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specific acts or omissions by counsel which, viewed from the perspective of counsel at trial, fall below the standard of reasonable professional assi~tance.~'
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court explicitly refused
to enumerate specific guidelines, or to compose a checklist for judging
attorney ~ompetence.~~'
The Court held that, "no particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the
variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defend ~ t . "Moreover,
~ ~
such a set of rules would interfere with the independence of counsel and could distract counsel from vigorous advoca~ y Instead,
. ~ ~
the Court relied on "the legal profession's maintenance
of a standard sufficient to justifl the law's presumption that counsel
will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the [Sixth] Arnendment envision^."^'
Central to the Court's holding was a strong presumption of reasonably competent assistance - decisions or actions taken by counsel
should be presumed to have been ~trategic.~~
Such a presumption is
required since "there are countless ways to provide effective assistance
in any given case."67 Moreover, according to the Court, the absence
of such a presumption would inevitably lead to "intrusive post-trial
inquiry"68into the quality of representation, which would in turn encourage proliferation of ineffectiveness claims, require an increased
number of second trials, result in a diminution in counsel's willingness
to serve, and "undermine the trust between attorney and client."69
61. Id. at 690.
62. Id. at 688.
63. Id. at 688-89.
64. Id. at 689.
65. Id. at 688.
66. Id. at 689.
67. Id. Nevertheless, the Court recognized certain basic duties: the duty of loyalty, the
duty to advocate the defendant's cause, the duty to consult with the defendant, the duty to
inform, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and the duty "to bring to bear such skill and
knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process." Id. at 688.
68. Id. at 690.
69. Id. Not all commentators are convinced that these results are really likely to occur.
See, e.g., Berger, supra note 11, at 82. Indeed, the unrealistically low fees paid to assigned
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As to the: requirement of prejudice, the Court distinguished prior
decisions dealing with the deprivation of counsel, where no showing of
prejudice is req~ired.~'According to the Court, in ineffectiveness cases, a showing of prejudice is necessary because (1) the government is
not responsible for and hence not able to prevent attorney error^;^' (2)
attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are just as likely to be
harmless as prejudicial; and (3) representation is an art, and an act or
omission that is considered unprofessional in one setting may be
"sound or even brilliant" in another.72
Finally, the Court advised that the lower courts need not evaluate
counsel's performance before addressing the question of prejudice. "If
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack
of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course
should be followed."73
2. The Other Opinions
Justice Brennan concurred in part and dissented in part.74 He
agreed with the Court's articulation of the standard for judging ineffectiveness claims because he believed that that standard "will both pro-

counsel are more likely to impact on the diligence of the defense bar than accurate prescriptions about the basic components of effective criminal representation. On the other hand,
O'Connor's refusal to formulate a checklist may not have been wrong. Because of the vast
importaxe of the facts at trial, the kind of checklist that could have been adopted by the
Court, such as the ABA's Standards Relating to the Defense Function, that could be applicable to all criminal cases, would likely be so general as to be barely helpful.
70. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
71. But see Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 65-74 (1991) (arguing that the
prosecutor's obligation to do justice requires that he or she assist in preventing errors by
defense counsel).
72. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
73. Id at 697. This focus on outcome is consistent with the Court's harmless error
jurisprudence, in which it has increasingly focused on the reliability of the determination of
guilt rather than on procedural fairness. See, e.g., Brecht, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). The importance of this announcement by the Supreme Court cannot be overstated; the absence of
prejudice is the most frequent basis for dismissing claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
See infra text acconlpanying notes 185-86.
74. See supra note 51.
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vide helpful guidance to courts considering claims of actual ineffectiveness of counsel and also permit those courts to continue their efforts to
achieve progressive development of this area of the law."75 He also
stated his belief that the standards "are sufficiently precise to permit
meaningful distinctions between those attorney derelictions that deprive
defendants of their constitutional rights and those that do not; at the
same time, the standards are ~ ~ c i e n t flexible
ly
to accommodate the
wide variety of situations giving rise to claims of this kind."76
Justice Marshall dissented, disagreeing with both the performance
standard and the prejudice req~irement.'~According to Justice Marshall, the standard of "reasonable competence" is so vague that it is
either meaningless or would permit too much variation in the courts.78
For example, he questioned whether "reasonable competence" referred
to a reasonably competent retained or assigned la&
and whether the
standard of performance would change to reflect different standards in
different parts of the country.79He also disagreed with the majority's
assertion that uniform standards were impossible to formulate. Accepting counsel's "wide latitudey' for strategic decision-making, Justice
Marshall suggested that much of the work involved in trial preparation
- bail applications, client communication, objecting at trial, and filing
a notice of appeal - could be the subject of uniform standard^.'^ Finally, Justice Marshall predicted that the court's refusal to formulate
such standards "will stunt the development of constitutional doctrine .in
this area.""
With respect to the requirement of prejudice, Justice Marshall
stressed the difficulty of making an evaluation of prejudice from a
record created by ineffective counsel.82 In addition, he rejected the

75. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 702.
76. Id. at 703.
77. Id. at 707.
78. Id. Justice Marshall stated, "[tlo tell lawyers and the lower c o h that counsel for
a criminal defendant must behave 'reasonably' and must act like 'a reasonably competent
attorney,'. . is to tell them nothing." Id. at 707-08 (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 708.
80. Id. at 709.
81. Id.
82. As Justice Marshall explained:
a

.
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majority's attempt to interpret the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistarice as a protection only against conviction of the innocent, stressing that the guarantee "also functions to ensure that convictions are obtained only through fundamentally fair procedures":
The majority contends that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a
manifestly guilty defendant is convicted after a trial in which he was represented by a manifestly ineffective attorney. I cannot agree. Every defendant is entitled to a trial in which his interests are vigorously and conscientiously advocated by an able lawyer. A proceeding in which the defendant does not receive meaningful assistance in meeting the forces of the
State does not, in my opinion, constitute due pro~ess.~'

Accordingly, Justice Marshall would have held that, "a showing
that the perforrnance of a defendant's lawyer departed fiom professionally prescribed standards requires a new trial regardless of whether the
defendant suffkred demonstrable prejudice thereb~."'~Finally, Justice
Marshall rejected the majority's presumption of reasonable competence,
characterizing it as merely an attempt to avoid having to resolve ineffectiveness clai~ms.~~

mt is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in
which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his lawyer had
been competent. Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by
good defense counsel. On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a
reviewing court confidently to ascertain how the government's evidence and arguments would have stood up against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd,
well-prepared lawyer. The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are
exacerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to the defendant may be
missing fiom the record precisely because of the incompetence of defense counsel.
Id. at 710.
83. Id. at 711.
84. Id. at 712.
85. Id. Justice Marshall also rejected what he viewed as the majority's attempt to
avoid relitigation of claims rejected under other, previously formulated standards, by suggesting that its standard was not different from other, earlier standards. As he concluded: "Nothing the majority says can relieve lower courts that hitherto have been using standards more
tolerant of ineffectual advocacy of their obligation to scrutinize all claims, old as well as
new, under the principles laid down today." Id. at 714-15.
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A. Constitutional Foundation
There has been longstanding confusion about the constitutional
source for the rights afforded an appellant in a criminal case. The right
to appeal is not mentioned in the Constitution. And, although the issue
is far fiom clear, the Court has never explicitly held that the Due
Process Clause requires or does not require appellate review in criminal
These complexities have been reflected in the Supreme Court's
decisions addressing the scope of the right to counsel on appeal. Beginning in 1963, in Douglas v. Calfornia, without any discussion of
whether or not there is a Constitutional right to appeal, the Supreme
Court held that there is a right to counsel on an appeal as of right
guaranteed by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.88
In Douglas, the Court examined a California rule of criminal procedure authorizhg state appellate courts to review a trial record to
determine whether appointment of appellate counsel would be advantageous to the defendant or the court itself." If appointment would not

86. See, e.g., Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503 (1992) (suggesting that it is time to re-evaluate the constitutional status of the right to appeal); Alex S. Ellerson, Note, The Right to Appeal and Appellate Procedural Reform, 91 COLUM.L. REV. 373, 377-78 (1991) (arguing that there is a
constitutional right to appeal); Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U W . CHI. L. REV. 1, 9 (1994) (expressing "some sympathy" for the argument that
there is a right to appeal, but doubting that the current Supreme Court would so hold).
Resolution of the issue of whether there is a constitutional right to appeal in crirninal cases is beyond the scope of this article. In any event, the Supreme Court has clearly
held that where a state has created a right to appeal, an appellant has certain due process
rights, including the right to counsel (Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)), the right
to the effective assistance of counsel (Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)), and the right
to equal protection of the laws (Id. at 403). In none of these decisions has the Court addressed the constitutional status of a criminal appeal.
87. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
88. Id at 357. See Evitts, 469 U.S. at 402-03.
89. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355.
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be beneficial to either of them, no counsel would be appointed.g0
Speaking implicitly in the fundamental fairness language of due process
analysis, the Court held that if a state afforded a statutory right to
appeal, it was required to appoint counsel for all indigent appellants to
"make. that appeal more than a 'meaningless ritual. ""'
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas compared the right to a
free transcript on appeal, which was established in Grz$n v. IlinoisYg2
to the right to assistance of counsel and concluded that the denial of
either was the same - "discrimination against the indigent."g3 Justice
Harlan, relying on due process grounds rather than equal protection,
dissented and concluded that California's practice was not fundamentally unfair.94
Three years later, in Anders v. California,gs the Court outlined the
procedure required for appointed counsel wishing to withdraw from a
frivolous appeal.96 In doing so, the Court refised to uphold
California's procedures, which permitted assigned counsel to withdraw
simply by advising the court that the appeal had no merit; that is,
without requiring the court to conclude that the appeal was indeed
frivolous. In its holding, the Court employed both equal protection
and due process lang~age.~'

Id.
Id. at 358.
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
386 U.S. 738 (1967).
The Court defined the procedure as follows:
mf counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination
of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record
that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel's brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the
court - not counsel - then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.
Id. at 744.
97. The Court stated: "The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair
process can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf
of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae." Id at 744.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
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Next, in Ross v. M~fitt;~the Court upheld a state's denial of appointment of counsel on discretionary review. The Court held that
fundamental fairness did not require counsel at that stage of a criminal
case."
Finally, in Evitts v. Lucey,loOdecided in 1984, the Court extended the right to counsel on appeal to include the right to effective assistance of co~nsel.'~'In doing so, it confronted directly the "seeming
ambiguity" about whether Douglas, Anders, and Ross were based on
equal protection or on fundamental fairness principles.'02
,

In Evitts, the Court affirmed the reversal of an order dismissing an
appeal for counsel's failure to file a "statement of appeal," as required
by Kentucky's court rules.lo3 The Court began its decision by noting
that the case presented the "intersection of two lines of cases'y104those cases holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal appellant certain minimum safeguards necessary to make the appeal
"'adequate and effe~tive,'"'~~
and those cases holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at trial comprehends the right to effective
assistance of counsel.lo6
In recognizing the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal, however, the Court emphasized that the right is a due process
right; that is, one based on fundamental fairness secured entirely and
directly by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
rather than through the Equal Protection Clause or by incorporation of
the Sixth Amendment.'07 The Court relied on its prior statement in
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

417

U.S. 600 (1974).

Id. at 605.
469

U.S. 387 (1984).

Id at 405.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 405. The state rule required that appellants serve with the record on appeal
a "statement of appealn that contained the names of appellants and appellees, counsel, the
trial judge, the date of judgment, the date of notice of appeal, and other miscellaneous information. Id. at 389.
104. Id. at 392.
105. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956)).
106. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 392 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)).
107. After citing a long list of cases addressing "the standards used to judge ineffectiveness, the remedy ordered, and the rationale used," the Court held: "We express no opin-
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Ross v. Moflitt'08 that "the precise rationale for the Grzpn and Douglas lines of cases has never been explicitly stated, some support being
derived fiom the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Arnendment and some fiom the Due Process Clause of that Amendment,"'09
and on Bearden v. Ge~rgia,"~
where it held that "[dlue process and
equal protection principles converge in the Court's analysis in these
cases.""' The: Court noted that its "rather clear statement in Ross that
the Due Process Clause played a significant role in prior decisions is
well supported by the cases them~elves.""~
Thus, the Court interpreted Grzfin, where it had reversed a dismissal of an appeal because the petitioner could not afford a trans~ript,"~as protecting a state's determination that, "it was unwilling
to curtail drastically a defendant's liberty unless a second judicial decision-maker, the appellate court, was convinced that the conviction was
in accord with law."l14 Having made that determination, the state
would have "violated due process principles because it decided the
appeal in a way that was arbitrary with respect to the issues invol~ed.'''~~

ion as to the merits of any of these decisions." Evitts, 469 U.S. at 398 n.9.
It is true that Strickland has been construed to interpret the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel as requiring no more than a fair trial. See Richard L. Gabriel, The Strickland
Standard for Claims of IneffectiveAssistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment
in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1259, 1266 (1986). Under such an interpretation, the right to counsel, and the other rights enumerated in the Sixth Amendment, are
no more than guarantees of a fair trial. The right to a fair trial is also a significant aspect
of the Due Process protection. While it thus could be argued that the Strickland standard is
fully applicable to the due process right to effective assistance of appellate counsel as well
as the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, such an argument proves
too much. If valid, it would do away with the Sixth Amendment and its discrete analysis
by making it co-extensive with the Fourteenth Amendment The Court has never carried its
Sixth Amendment analysis that far.
108. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
109. Evitfs, 469 U.S. at 403 (quoting Ross, 417 U.S. at 608-09).
110. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
111. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 403 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665).
112. Id
113. Gr@n, 351 U.S. at 20.
114. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 403-04.
115. Id. at 404.
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Rejecting the state's contention that all rights enjoyed by criminal
appellants arise only from the equal protection clause, the Evitts Court
explained that if the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal
were simply an equal protection right, which would be measured by
the rights of nonindigents, nonindigents would themselves have no
right to effective a~sistance."~
In conclusion, the Court explained:
In cases like Gr@n and Douglas, due process concerns were involved
because the States involved had set up a system of appeals as of right but
had refused to offer each defendant a fair opportunity to obtain an adjudication on the merits of his appeal. Equal protection concerns were involved because the State treated a class of defendants - indigent ones differently for purposes of offering them a meaningful appeal. Both of
these concerns were implicated in the GrifJin and Douglas cases and both
Clauses supported the decisions reached by this C ~ u r t . " ~

Although it has recognized the importance of counsel on an appeal
as of right, the Supreme Court clearly stated in Evitts that since the
State did not challenge the finding of counsel's deficiency, it "need not
decide the content of appropriate standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of appellant counsel. CJ: Strickland v. Washington
[citation omitted]."l18 As at least one judge has noted, "[alrguably,
the 'cf.' cite to Strickland implies that the appellate standard might be
different."'lg
Additionally, as noted above, the Court's holding that the right to
effective assistance arises directly out of the due process clause rather
than from the Sixth Amendment indicates that the Court's analysis of
the issue of ineffectiveness on appeal may not be the same as its Sixth
Amendment analysis of ineffectiveness at trial. Thus, Strickland's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at trial does not
necessarily define the standard for appellate-counsel ineffectiveness.

116. Id. at 404-05.
117. Id. at 405. Justice Rehnquist, joined by then-Chief Justice Berger dissented on the
ground that the Court's prior decisions had been based on Equal Protection principles and
that there was no due process right to effective appellate counsel. Id. at 405, 408.
118. Id. at 398.
119. Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798, 808 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., dissenting). See
infa Parts V.A. and V.B.
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The Nature of the Right to Effective Assistance of Appellate
Counsel: The Application of Strickland by US. Circuit Courts of
Appeal

Faced with the Supreme Court's silence, all of the Circuit Courts
of Appeal have applied the Strickland standard to claims of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel.'20 Most have done so without analysis.I2'
The Ninth Circuit is the only court to have even attempted an articulated rationale supporting application of the Strickland standard on
appeal.
In United States v. Birtle,'22 the Ninth Circuit relied on the
Strickland Court's statement that "the principles governing ineffectiveness claims should apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do
on direct appeal or in motions for a new trial"'23 as support for the
proposition that Strickland's analysis of the performance of trial counsel applies as well to appellate counsel.'24 However, the quoted statement does not support that conclusion. Rather, a fair reading of this
language in context indicates that the Court was talking about application of its principles not to performance of counsel in each of these
three forums but rather td review of inej6ectiveness claims brought in
these three forums: collateral proceedings, direct appeal, or motions for
a new trial based on ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The relevant language appears in Section IV of the Strickland opinion, which addresses
the applicatio:~of the newly announced standards.I2' The entire para120. United States v. Victoria, 876 F2d 1009 (1st Cir. 1989); Abdurrahman v.
Henderson, 897 F.2d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1990); Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1987);
Griffin v. Aiken, 775 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1985); Schwander v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 494,
501-02 (5th Cir. 1985); Bransford v. Brown, 806 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1986); Gray v. Greer,
800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1986); Blackmon v. White, 825 F.2d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1987); .
United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1986); Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501
(10th Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775, 780 (llth Cir. 1984), overruled on other
ground! by Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1494 (llth Cir. 1986).
121. See, e.g., People v. Santos, 741 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir. 1984); Morgan v. Zant, 743
F.2d at 780.
122. 792 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1986).
123. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
124. Birtle, 792 F.2d at 847.
125. Section JY of the opinion begins: "A number of practical considerations
. im-

..
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graph in which the relevant language appears is about habeas review;
indeed, the paragraph concludes that, "no special standards ought to
apply to ineffectiveness claims made in habeas proceeding^."'^^
Three years later, and perhaps reflecting the court's uncertainty
about its statement in Birtle, the Ninth Circuit offered an entirely different reason for relying on Strickland in assessing claims of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. In Miller v. Keeney,'" the court relied
on language in Penson v. Ohio,'28 where the Supreme Court held that
cases in which a defendant has been actually or constructively denied
assistance of appellate counsel are not subject to the Strickland standard.lZg According to the Ninth Circuit, this language implied that
Strickland would apply where the claim is not that counsel was denied,
but that counsel was ineffective.l3' This, conclusion, however, is fallacious. The fact that Strickland's prejudice requirement may not apply
where there is a total deprivation of counsel does not mean that the
requirement does apply to a claim of deficient performance on appeal.
C. Categories of Appellate Ineffectiveness Claims
Applying Strickland, federal decisions evaluating claims of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel have focused on three major categories of
ineffectiveness:

(1) failure to gain or protect access to the appeal, such as
failure to file a notice of appeal or some other jurisdictional
portant for the application of the standards we have outlined." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.
126. Id. at 698.
127. 882 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1989).
128. 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
129. Id. at 88-89. The Ninth Circuit's entire analysis is as follows:
We review claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel according to the
standard set out in Strickland v. Washington [citation omitted]. United States v.
Birtle [citation omitted]. See also Penson v. Ohio [citation omitted] (holding that
where a defendant has been actually or constructively denied the assistance of appellate counsel altogether, the Strickland standard does not apply and prejudice is
presumed; the implication is that Strickland does apply where counsel is present
but ineffective).
Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434.
130. Id.

Heinonline - - 97 W. Va. L. Rev. 21 1994-1995

22

WEST VIRG11V.4 LAW RE VIEW

p o l . 97:l

document, or the failure to advise the client concerning his
right to appeal;13'
(2) deficient perfection of the appeal, such as deficient briefing, failure to appear at oral argument or to file a reply
brief;132and

(3) deficient selection of appellate issues.133
1. Securing Access to Appeal
Findings of ineffectiveness most frequently arise in this first category of cases. Here, either from attorney nonfeasance or malfeasance, a
defendant is deprived entirely of his right to appellate review. That
~ ~ the Supreme Court reversed
was the case in Evitts v. L u ~ e y , 'where
an order dismissing an appeal for failure to file a required "statement
of appeal" containing procedural details.13' Another example is United
~ ~Gipson, the court vacated an order denying a
States v. G i p ~ 0 n . lIn
motion to set aside a sentence, where the defendant lost his right to
appeal by his attorney's failure to inform him about the time limit for
filing a notice of appeal.13' In a similar case, Bell v. Lo~khart,"~
the court vacated an order denying a writ of habeas corpus, where a
state prisoner had been denied effective assistance of counsel when he
lost the right to appeal based on incorrect advice concerning the risks
of appeal.I3'

131. E.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
132. E.g., Lofton v. Whitley, 905 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1990), discussed infa text accompanying notes 143-45.
133. E.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), discussed inza text accompanying
notes 164-68.
134. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 100-18.
136. 985 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1993).
137. Id. at 217.
138. 795 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1986).
139. Id at 658. In Bell, the defendant's attorney had erroneously advised him that he
would again face the death penalty if he were successhl on appeal, even though the death
sentence had not been imposed following the first trial. Id. at 656.
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It is easy to see why this type of claim produces the most fiequent finding of ineffectiveness. In these cases, the deficient performance prong of the Strickland standard was either uncontested (as in
Evitts and Bell) or extremely clear (as in Gipson). There simply is no
strategic reason for failing to preserve a client's right to appeal.
Most importantly, the courts have held that in this context a defendant who loses access to the appellate court need not skiow that he
has been prejudiced, the most prevalent ground for denying ineffectiveness of counsel claims.140The courts have concluded that a defendant
who loses his right to appeal because he relies on his attorney's jurisdictional error suffers prejudice per se.14' That is, as long as the appellant establishes (1) an intention to appeal; and (2) a reliance on the
attorney to preserve the right to do so, the appellant need not show
that she had some chance of success on appeal. Thus, having determined that the defendants in Gipson and Bell did not otherwise waive
their rights to appeal, the courts found that they were prejudiced by
counsel's deficient performance and granted the requested relief.14'
2. Perfection of Appeal

The second category of cases - where, although the appeal was
heard on the merits, counsel's preparation or presentation was deficient
- is the rarest. Moreover, claims of outright deficient briefing, in the
sense of the failure to persuasively present the facts, to research the
law, or to apply relevant law to the facts, are almost always unsucwhere the court held
cessful. An exception is LoJton v. FVl~itley,'~~
that state appellate counsel's submission of a two-page brief raising no
issues and merely invoking the court's statutorily prescribed review
"for errors patentyy144
from the record was deficient performance that

140. See supra note 73; see also infia text accompanying notes 184-86.
141. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 389-90.
142. Bell, 795 F.2d at 658; Gipson, 985 F.2d at 217. In fact, an attorney's failure to
protect a client's access to the appellate court is equivalent to the absence of counsel on
appeal; that is, counsel does nothing for the client on appeal. Thus, the same per se standard applicable to the absence of counsel is applicable here.
143. 905 F.2d 885.
144. Id. at 885.
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was presurnp1:ively prejudicial and required relief.I4' This gross failure
to press a clicznt's case, in the words of the Evitts Court, to "make the
adversarial system
is the only type of deficient performance
that is likely to establish ineffecti~eness.'~'

'

A recurring claim in this category is that counsel was deficient in
failing to notice and therefore to correct the absence of portions of the
trial transcript. For example, in .Bransford v. Brown,148 petitioner
sought a writ of habeas corpus based on the absence of jury instruction
transcripts in the appellate record and his appellate counsel's failure to
notice and correct that absence.I4' The court held that counsel's performance was deficient150by reasoning that, "appellate counsel's duty
cannot be discharged unless he has a transcript of the court's charge to
the j~ry."''~
Nonetheless, the court refused to grant the writ because the petitioner failed to satisfy Stricklands prejudice prong.Is2 The court held
that he had not established prejudice, reasoning that (1) there was no
showing that the charge could have been located or rec~nstructed;'~~
and (2) there was no evidence that, even if available, the transcripts
would have revealed reversible error.Is4 Indeed, the only evidence in
this regard was that the trial attorney had "never expressed a belief
.that the instructions were important to an appeal.""' On this basis,
the court concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish prejudice.lS6

145. Id. at 888, 890.
146. See Evifts, 469 U.S. at 394 ("[tlhe attorney must . play the role of an active
advocate, rather than a mere friend of the court assisting in a detached evaluation of the
appellant's claim").
147. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984); Stano v. Dugger,
921 F.2d 1125, 1152 (11th Cir. 1991); Harding v. Davis, 878 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1989).
148. 806 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1986).
149. Id. at 84.
150. Id. at 86.
151. Id. (citing Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282 (1964)).
152. Bransford, 806 F.2d at 87.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. See also Julius v. Johnson, 840 F.2d 1533 (no prejudice established based on

. .
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Similarly, in Schwander v. Bla~kburn,'~'transcripts of the jury
voir dire, openings and summations, jury instructions, and jury questions were all missing from the record, and counsel failed to obtain
them.lS8 The court held that because there was no showing that any
objections were made during any of the missing proceedings, no error
had been preserved for review under Louisiana's criminal code.'59
According to the court, the absence of any preserved error was sufficient to establish that no prejudice resulted from the incomplete transcript.160 The court thus concluded, quoting Strickland, that even if
there were error, the failure to raise it on appeal "does not warrant
setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding [because] the error
had no effect on the judgment."161
3. Selection of Issues

. The overwhelming majority of federal decisions regarding ineffectiveness of appellate counsel concern the third category of claims the failure to raise a specified issue on appeal. Most of these cases
occur on habeas review of state court convictions, as in Evitts,
Schwander, Bell, and Bransf~rd.'~~
In this third type of case, the failure to raise a specified issue or issues on direct appeal is alleged either
to constitute a due process violation requiring habeas relief or to establish cause for procedural default of that issue in the state court, permitting federal habeas review.163Ineffectiveness is very rarely found in
these cases.
failure to include voir dire in record since there was no suggestion of any constitutional
violation during that proceeding), reh'g denied, 854 F.2d 400 (11th Cir. 1988).
157. 750 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985).
158. Id. at 497.
159. Id. at 502.
160. Id.
161. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691).
162. See discussion supra Parts III.C.1. and III.C.2.
163. The proliferation of these claims is the natural result of the Supreme Court's decision in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), which established that ineffectiveness under
Strickland would constitute cause under the "cause and prejudice" standard for procedural
default. Id. at 488-89. These cases generally involve the failure to raise an issue, rather than
other types of deficient performance (for example, an inadequate briet), or failure to appeal
at all.
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There are several reasons for this result. As the Supreme Court
made clear in Jones v. Barnes,164the decision concerning what issues
to raise on appeal is firmly committed to counsel's judgment.16s In
Jones, the Court held that appellate counsel has no constitutional duty
to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal if counsel, as a matter of
professional judgment, decides not to raise such an issue.166In so
holding, the Court recognized that the decision of what issues to raise
is one of the most important strategic decisions to be made by appellate c0unse1.l~~The Court determined that counsel must be able to
exercise his reasonable professional judgment in selecting the most
promising issues for review and specifically advised that "a brief that
raises every colorable issue runs the risk of burying good argument~."'~~
Under Strickland, of course, as a question of strategy, the
decision about what issues to raise and which ones to omit is subject
to tremendous deference on appeal.169Thus, reversal has been extremely rare.
The central focus of the courts in these cases is the merit or lack
of merit of the unraised issue. However, the courts' defmitions of
prejudice have not been consistent. In one set of cases, the courts have
held that the failure to raise an issue that is "without merit" is not
ineffectivene~s."~Another way of saying this is that the failure to
raise an issue that "would not result in reversal" is not ineffectiveness.171 In another set of cases, the failure to raise an unpreserved issue has been rejected as not ineffective."' Although the
basis
164. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 754.
167. Id. at 752. In reality, such a decision reflects several strategic judgments: (1)
whether to reject an issue of lesser merit in favor of one of merit; (2) whether to reject an
issue of lesser merit that might impact badly on issues of greater merit; and (3) to raise as
few issues as possible, so as not to detract fiom issues of merit.
168. Jones, 463 U.S. at 753.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
170. See, e.g., Meyer v. Sargent, 854 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1988); Kilt v. Clarke, 931
F.2d 1246 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1990); Heath v.
Jones, 941 F.2d 1126 (llth Cir. 1991); White v. Florida, 939 F.2d 912 (llth Cir. 1991).
171. See, e.g., Coe v. Thurma., 922 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1991).
172. See, e.g., Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir. 1989); Richburg v.
Hood, 794 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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for the finding of no ineffectiveness in these cases is not clear, it most
likely rests on the perception that unpreserved error is not sfliciently
clear from the record so that failure to discover it is not ineffectiveness. Moreover, reversal rarely is based on unpreserved error so that it
is a reasonable strategic judgment not to raise it. Another reason for a
finding of no ineffectiveness may be that because the unpreserved error
would not have resulted in reversal, the failure to raise it was not
~rejudicial.'~~

A third set of cases do not articulate any degree of merit, noting
simply that a sufficiently meritorious issue would not have been over~~
looked or omitted by competent counsel. In Claudio v. S ~ u l l y , 'the
Second Circuit found that the failure to raise a state constitutional
claim of denial of counsel established deficient performance because
"[nlo reasonably competent attorney should have missed [it]."'75
Therefore, the attorney's decision "cannot be viewed reasonably as a
strategic de~ision."'~~
In a fourth set of cases, rather than look simply at the merit of the
unraised claim, as the courts do in reviewing trial counsel's decisions,
the courts treat the issue as one of the relative merit between raised
and unraised claims. For example, in Gray v. Greer,'77 the court stated:
When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on failure to
raise viable issues, the district court must examine the trial court record to
determine whether appellate counsel failed to present significant and obvious issues on appeal. Significant issues which could have been raised
should then be compared to those which were raised. Generally, only
when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the
presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.'78

173. While it clearly is more difficult to establish prejudice and thus ineffectiveness
where the omitted issue is unpreserved, it would be possible to establish ineffectiveness
where the federal court concludes that the state court would have entertained the issue under
the state court's plain error standard of review. See Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798 (2d
Cir. 1992).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 805.
176. Id.
177. 800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1986).
178. Id at 646. See also Freeman, 962 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1992) (no strategic reason
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The court remanded the case to the district court:
[ g o review the trial court record and determine whether the issues which
petitioner claims appellate counsel failed to raise, would have been clearly
more likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial, and were so
obvious fiom the trial record that the failure to present such issues
amounted to ineffective assistance of appellate co~nsel."~

Similarly, in Mayo v. Hender~on,'~~
the court found ineffectiveness in appellate counsel's failure to raise as an appellate issue the
That
prosecutor's :failure to turn over prior statements of witnesse~.'~~
issue had been preserved; indeed at trial the court had castigated the
prosecutor for her conduct. Moreover, the state's highest court had
established, i n another case, that the failure to turn over such prior
statements was reversible per se. In finding ineffectiveness, the Mayo
court noted that appellate counsel had raised significantly weaker
issues, such :is a challenge to credibility determinations by a pretrial
hearing court and a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence where
there was eyewitness identification proof.Is2
Case law indicates that only where counsel fails to raise a clear,
preserved, anti meritorious issue will that failure be held to constitute
ineffectivene~:;.'~~
That is, despite the Strickland performance standard
of reasonable competence, courts generally refuse to find ineffectiveness unless counsel overlooked a clearly winning issue.184Indeed,
exists for failing to raise strongest issue in case).
179. Gray, 800 F.2d at 647.
180. 13 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 1994).
181. Such statements are denominated Rosario material in New York pursuant to People
v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d 881 (N.Y. 1961).
182. Mayo, 13 F.3d at 536. Echoing the Seventh Circuit's language in Gray, the court
held that, on review of the record:
[Slignificant issues which could have been raised should then be compared to those
which were raised. Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than
those presented will the presumption of effective assistance be overcome.
Id at 533 (quoting Gray, 800 F.2d at 646).
183. Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1992); Daniel v. Thigpen, 742 F. Supp.
1535 (M.D. Ala 1990); Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1986).
184. This is a result of importing the prejudice prong into the perfonnance prong. See
infia text accompanying note 278.
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most appellate courts have resolved these claims by taking advantage
of the Strickland Court's permission to proceed directly to the prejudice prong of Strickland7lg5holding that even if counsel's decision
about what issues to raise was unreasonable, the defendant was not
prejudiced by that decision.lg6
Judicial focus on the merit of unraised claims - that is, on
Strickland's prejudice prong - causes several problems in the context
of reviewing claims of ineffective appellate counsel. First, confusion
exists about whether the degree of merit is relevant to the performance
prong of the Strickland test, the prejudice prong, or both. Thus, for
the First Circuit held that
example, in United States v. Vi~toria,'~~
counsel's failure to raise ccmeritlesspoints" would not have aected the
outcome of the trial, clearly focusing on the failure to establish prejudice.''' In Beavers v. L o ~ k h a r t ,the
~ ~ ~court held that the failure to
argue several issues did not establish ineffectiveness of counsel. However, the court failed entirely to specify whether that failure constituted
deficient performance, lack of prejudice, or both.lgOFinally, in Miller
v. Keeney,lgl the Ninth Circuit explicitly held that the two prongs of
Strickland ccpartiallyoverlap"192because appellate counsel will choose
not to raise an issue because counsel foresees little or no success and
because the *failure to raise that issue will not amount to prejudice.lg3
However, while the relative merit of a course of action is to some extent involved in evaluating whether reasonably competent counsel
would have pursued it, the Strickland Court explicitly formulated the
185. See supra text accompanying note 73.
186. See, e.g., Holland v. Scully, 797 F.2d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 1986); Whitley v. Bair, 802
F.2d 1487, 1494 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing SfricMand, 466 U.S. at 697)); Willie v. Maggio,
737 F.2d 1372, 1392 (5th Cir. 1984), United States v. Fakhoury, 819 F.2d 1415, 1419 (7th
Cir. 1987).
187. 876 F.2d 1009 (1st Cir. 1989).
188. Id. at 1013.
189. 755 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1985).
190. Id. at 663.
191. 882 F.2d 1428 (9th Cu. 1989).
192. Id. at 1434.
193. As the court stated: "Appellate counsel will therefore frequently remain above an
objective standard of competence (prong one) and have caused her client no prejudice (prong
two) for the same reason - because she declined to raise a weak issue. Such is the case
here." Id.
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"reasonable probability" of success standard solely for evaluation of
prejudice - the second part of its test.Ig4It did not suggest that the
likelihood of success was relevant to determining cornpeten~e.'~'Indeed, its express grant of permission to the courts to proceed directly
to the prejudlice testIg6is additional evidence that the two are separate. To the extent that courts have evaluated appellate counsel competence by focusing on the likely success of omitted issues, they are
"altering the first prongyyof Strickland without authority.'97
Aside h m generating confusion between the two prongs of the
StricWand test, the focus on the merits of omitted claims has created
another significant problem. Many issue-omission cases are adjudicated
on federal habeas review of state convictions, either in the context of
procedural default or on the merits. In those cases, the omitted issue
was never presented to a state court.lg8Thus, as discussed more filly
below,Ig9 on Elabeas review, the federal court must predict the resolution of unraised issues under state constitutional and common law
where the state has not addressed those issues. In cases in which the
omitted issue was not preserved, the federal court must also predict
whether a state appellate court would be willing to entertain an unpreserved issue as plain or fundamental error.200 Traditionidly, the federal habeas courts sit to correct federal constitutional errors by the state courts, not to predict state court interpretations of state law.201 The extent to which the simple corrective
194. See supra text accompanying note 42.
195. See Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d at 810 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("[slince
Strickland used 'reasonable probability' to measure the likelihood that a trial outcoma would
have been different [in order to assess prejudice from lawyering already determined to be
deficient], it is ill-advised to press this same standard into service for the different task of
determining whether counsel's performance was deficient").
196. See supra text accompanying note 73.
197. See supra note 195.
198. See, e.g., id (where the omitted issue was a state constitutional claim). The failure
to raise the claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in the state courts has not been
found to constitutr: procedural default in such cases.
199. See injk Part 1V.B.
200. See, e.g., Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2347 (1993); Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, No. 93-9353, 1994
WL 245420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994).
201. See generally Rachel A. Van Cleave, When t3 an Error Not an "Error"? Habeas
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function intrudes on the concept of federalism has generated substantial
concern and resulted in substantial Supreme Court limitation on habeas
review?02 Federal interpretation of state law and prediction of state
court results are major additional intrusions beyond the appropriate
corrective role of the habeas courts?"

IV. THE APPLICATIONOF STRICKLAND
TO APPELLATECOUNSEL
As noted above, all of the Circuit Courts of Appeals are currently
applying ihe Strickland standard to evaluate the effectiveness of appellate counsel.204This section analyzes the applicability of Strickland to
appellate counsel in light of the functional differences between trial and
appellate counsel and the differences in the trial and appellate forums.
It also surveys the way in which the courts of appeals are applying
Strichdand to appellate counsel.

Corpus and Cumulative Error Analysis, BA BAY LOR L. REV. 59 (1993).
202. See supra note 15.
203. Claudio, 982 F.2d at 810 (Ne\vman, J., dissenting). In Claudio, this federal "star
gazing" resulted in a grant of a writ of habeas corpus where counsel had failed to raise an
issue in the New York Court of Appeals after it had been rejected by the Appellate Division. Id. at 806. To grant the writ, the Second Circuit analyzed Nevi York law and determined that the issue had a reasonable probability of success in the Court of Appeals under
Court of Appeals case law. Id at 805. In fact, when the case was later decided by the New
York Court of Appeals on remand, the conviction was affirmed. People v. Claudio, 629
N.E.2d 384 (N.Y. 1993).
Parenthetically, where ineffectiveness of appellate counsel is reviewed in the state
courts, such as New York, the appellate court that determines the ineffectiveness claim is
the same court that entertained the ineffectively presented appeal, and the same court that
would entertain the merits of the properly presented appeal if relief is granted. See People
v. Bachert, 516 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Ct App. 1987). That court knows whether it would have
reversed or would reverse based on the performance of an effective attorney. Because of
this, the concept of "probability" that fits ineffectiveness in the trial context - where the
outcome - the verdict - cannot be reconstructed (so that some speculation will always be
required), or can only be reconstructed after the expense and effort of an entirely new trial
- is not appropriate on appeal.
204. See supra Part IILB.
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A. Functional Dzyerences between Trial and Appellate Counsel
1. Trial Counsel
Chronologically, trial counsel's frst duty is to inform herself about
the facts. In doing so, counsel must interview the defendant and his
witnesses; formulate a theory of the case; evaluate the relevant law;
determine the scope of the investigation; advise the client of his rights;
determine what if any pretrial motions to make; draft, file, and litigate
whether to and if so how to plea barg&,
those motions; dete&e
and, if no bargain results, determine how to try the case. If there is a
trial, counsel must advise the client about the advantages of a bench
trial or a j q r trial; if a jury trial is selected, counsel must participate
in voir dire, decide whether to give an opening statement; decide
whether to present a defense, and if so, what witnesses to call; determine how and to what extent to conduct cross-examination; determine
what trial motions to make and when to object; decide what charges to
request; sum up; decide whether, and if so, what to argue in post-trial
motions; and determine what to argue in mitigation of sentence. This
inlist, modeled after the ABA Standards for Criminal Justi~e,2~~
cludes only the most basic functions of trial counsel.
Several considerations arguably support the Supreme Court's refusal in Strickland to formulate a checklist of defense duties and to defer
almost entirely to counsel's decisions. While it may seem obvious,
evaluating the quality of trial counsel's performance depends largely on
the facts of the case.'06 For example, the decision to spend time and
money investigating an alibi may be good strategy in one case; howev-

205. STANDAIDSFOR CRIMINAL JuSncE §§ 4-3.2(a), 4-3.8 (2d ed. 1980).
206. As the court in DeCoster stated:
The defense attorney's hnction consists, in large part, of the application of professional judgment to an infinite variety of decisions in the development and prosecution of the case. A determination whether any given action or omission by counsel
amounted to ineffective assistance cannot be divorced from consideration of the
peculiar facts and circumstances that influenced counsel's judgment. In this factladen atmosphere, categorical rules are not appropriate.
United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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er, where stronger defenses exist, that decision may appear strategically
questionable. Similarly, the extent of cross-examination depends almost
entirely on what has occurred on direct examination and on the other
evidence in the case. Plea bargaining strategy is also heavily factbased.
Moreover, most of the facts upon which counsel will formulate her
strategy are revealed during counsel's investigation and, because of
rules of confidentiality or otherwise, will never be exposed to judicial
scrutiny. The inevitable absence of such essential information for the
reviewing court may underlie the Strickland Court's determination that
substantial deference must be given to counsel's decisions as reasonably strategic choices.207
Similarly, much of the information that affects trial counsel's decisions necessarily comes from the client.208 The appropriately extensive
involvement of the client has several legally significant consequences.
First, counsel's conduct and decisions may represent or be influenced
by the client's own desires about the course of the representation itself.20g The involvement of the client in certain strategic decisions al207. The DeCoster court stated:
Realistically, a defense attorney develops his case in large part from information
supplied by his client. As the Third Circuit indicated in Green, choices based on
such information should not later provide the basis for a claim of ineffectiveness
even though that basis would have been undercut by inquiry of others. Judicial
intervention to require that a lawyer run beyond, or around, his client, would raise
ticklish questions of intrusion into the attomeylclient relationship, and should be
reserved from extreme cases where an effect on the outcome can be demonstrated.
DeCoster, 624 F.2d at 209-10. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d 725
(1st Cir. 1987) (failure to cross-examine three incriminating witnesses was reasonable trial
strategy since it might have reinforced direct and there was no showing that cross-examination would have revealed anything that might have changed the verdict).
208. See, e.g., Schwander v. Blackbum, 750 F.2d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 1985) (failure to
call sister as witness was not ineffectiveness where there was no evidence that the defendant
mentioned to counsel that his sister could corroborate his alibi); United States v. Gray, 878
F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1989) (no ineffectiveness since reasonableness of counsel's actions in
investigation may be affected by the client's actions and choices).
209. As the Strickland Court noted:
The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually
based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on
information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions
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so may raise questions of waiver. It may well be that counsel's decision to forego a line of defense or a course of representation resulted
from the client.'^ own decision.
Finally, many of the decisions for which trial counsel is responsible, pdcularky those during trial, must be made quickly. Strict and
invasive judicial scrutiny of these decisions would interfere with the
need for prompt action.210Accordingly, counsel's decisions must be
entitled to deference.
These principles have resulted in a substantial body of case law
establishing few principles about the components of reasonably competent assistance, except that no decision by counsel that can fairly be
deemed strategic will constitute ineffectivene~s.~"Examples of legitimate strategic decisions include failure to cross-examine prosecution
witnesses,212 f ~ l u r eto object at all or to fully object,2I3 and waiver
of closing argument.214
On the other hand, those aspects of representation that have been
the basis for fuidings of ineffectiveness are those that cannot readily be
are reasonable depends critically on such information.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (a reviewing court must
scrutinize those inslances where the defendant "has given counsel reason to believe that
pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful"); Bainter v. Trickey, 932
F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1991) (no ineffectiveness for failure to file motion for new trial where
client initially indicated he did not wish to appeal his convictions).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[tlhe
performance standard is to be applied not in hindsight, but based on what the lawyer knew,
or should have known, at the time his tactical choices were made and implemented") (citing
United States v. Bor;ch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 986
(1992); Campell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 673 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that judicial review of
trial counsel's performance is highly deferential), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994); United States v. Sands, 968 F.2d 1058, 1065 (10th Cir. 1992) (same), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
987 (1993).
211. See discussion supra Part IILC.3.
212. See, e.g., United States v. Michaud, 925 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v.
Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1987) (no ineffectiveness since cross-examination
might have reinforced direct examination and thus was reasonable trial strategy).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 918 F.2d 236 (1st Cir. 1990) (failure to object
during opening statement); Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487, 495 (5th Cir. 1986) (failure
to fully object to prosecutor's summation), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 986 (1992).
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justified as strategic. They include, for example, lack of awareness or
understanding of essential legal principles$'' failure to conduct any
failure to conduct dis~overy;~~'
failure to
pretrial in~estigation;~'~
contact a potential alibi witness or to locate other corroborating or
other disinterested ~ i t n e s s e s ; ~the
' ~ decision to forgo the only available defense$'' or, in a capital case, to fail to investigate all possible
lines of defenset20 failure to investigate mitigating family and medical evidence in mitigation of death sentence and to be otherwise unprepared to argue in mitigation of sentence$' failure to obtain a transcript of a prior trial to impeach key w i t n e s s e ~ ;failure
~
to object to
the court's refusal to conduct an ex parte inquiry before denying a
request for psychiatric expert assi~tance;~
and failure to properly and
timely raise an issue of lack of corroborating evidence in a murder

215. See, e.g., Lewandowski v. Makel, 949 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1991) (failure to recognize change in law that resulted in defendant's failure to be aware that if he prevailed on
appeal to withdraw guilty plea to second degree murder he could again be charged with
first degree murder).
216. The failure adequately to investigate cases exists because counsel can hardly be
said to have made a strategic choice against pursuing a certain lime of investigation when
counsel has not yet obtained the facts on which such a decision could be made. See, e.g.,
Sullivan, 819 F.2d 1391, 1391-92 @&functory attempts to contact witnesses); Code v.
Montgomery, 799 F.2d 1481, 1483 (11th Cir. 1986) (counsel interviewed only one witness);
Nealy v. Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1985) (reiterating duty to make independent
investigation); Crisp v. Duckworth, 743 F.2d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1984) (same), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1226 (1985).
217. See, e.g., Morrison v. Kimmelman, 752 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1985).
218. See, e.g., Nealy v. Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1985); Sullivan v. Fairman,
819 F.2d 1382, 1391 (7th Cir. 1987); Montgomery v. Petersen, 846 F.2d 407 (7th Cir.
1988); Workman v. Tate, 957 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1992) (failure to contact two witnesses
defendant was with during events leading to his anest, whose testimony would have directly
contradicted arresting officers).
219. See, e.g., Weidner v. Wainwright, 708 F.2d 614, 616 (I lth Cir. 1983).
220. See, e.g., Osbom v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 627 (10th Cir. 1988).
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Blackbum v. Foltz, 828 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied. 485
U.S. 970 (1988).
223. See, e.g., United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 266 (1993) & 114 S. Ct. 560 (1993).
224. See, e.g., Summit v. Blackbum, 795 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1986).
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2. Appellate Counsel
Representation of a defendant on appeal is very different from trial
representation. Anders v. Californip requires that an accused have
cc
counsel acting in the role of an advocate." But what must that advocate do?
In Evitts Y. L u ~ e y the
, ~ ~Court outlined the general scope of the
due process right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal:
This right to counsel is limited to the first appeal as of right [citation
omitted] anal the attorney need not advance every argument, regardless of
merit, urged by the appellant [citation omitted]. But the attorney must be
available to assist in preparing and submitting a brief to the appellate
court [citation omitted] and must play the role of an active advocate, rather than a mere friend of the court assisting in a detached evaluation of the
appellant's claim. [citation ~rnitted].~'

The Evitts Court articulated two dimensions to the role of effective
appellate counsel: the ability to obtain a favorable decision by making
the adversary system work, and "that of expert professional whose
assistance is nc:cessary in a legal system governed by complex rules
and procedures for the defendant to obtain a decision at all - much

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

225. 386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967).
226. 469 U.S. 387 (1984).
227. Eviits, 469 U.S. at 394. It is important to emphasize the Supreme Court's recognition - which is perhaps contrary to the common perception-that appellate counsel has an
important role to play as an adversary. The commonly held perception that an appeal involves no more than the objective application of established law to record facts has repeatedly been rejected by the Court. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967)
(appellate counsel must be an "active advocate" rather than a detached evaluator); Penson v.
Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) (once the court determines that there are nonfrivolous issues, it
must appoint counsel, and may not rely on its own review of the record or on the briefs of
a co-appellant). As cliscussed in&, Part V.B., the fact that some courts claim to conduct an
independent review of the record in every case is not relevant to establishing a standard for
appellate counsel's performance. Indeed, the presence of appellate judges is no more relevant
than the presence of a trial judge, which was, of course, never even mentioned by the
Strickland Court
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less a favorable decision - on the merits of the case."228 These dimensions exist regardless of the facts of the case.
To fulfill this role, counsel must perform several specific duties.
First, counsel must be familiar with and follow the court's rules for
protecting the defendant's right to appeal, such as the rules of procedure for filing the notice of appeal and any related statements and for
ordering the transcript. Second, counsel must review the record for
possible appellate issues. Third, counsel must determine what issues to
raise in light of the facts, the law, the standard of review, and the
scope of review. Fourth, counsel must decide how to formulate those
issues. Fifth, counsel must find and use the most persuasive authority
available. And sixth, counsel must write persuasively - including marshalling the facts, analyzing the law, and applying it to the facts?29

B. Forum Differences and Their Effect on Finality
In addition to functional differences between trial and appellate
counsel, several differences between the trial and appellate forums
affect the courts' review of the effectiveness of trial and appellate

228. As the Court explained:
To prosecute the appeal a criminal appellant must face an adversary proceeding
that - like a trial - is governed by intricate mles that to a layperson would be
hopelessly forbidding. An unrepresented appellant - l i e an unrepresented defendant at trial - is unable to protect the vital interests at stake . . . . In short, the
promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel on appeal like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel at trial
- would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396-97.
229. I have not included the ability to orally argue as an essential skill of appellate
counsel. While it is an important skill, oral argument has been held not to be a critical
stage of the criminal process [U.S. v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846 (9th Cir 1986)]; moreover, the
action of some courts in either granting oral argument only in the court's discretion (See,
e.g., IST CIR. R. 34(a); 4 m CIR. R. 34(a); 7 m CIR. R. 34(f)), limiting oral argument to
very short periods of time (See, e.g., 2D CIR. R. 34@) (10-15 minutes); 3D CIR. R. 1.0.P.
2.1 (usually 15 minutes); 6 m CJR. R I.O.P. 19.4.1 (15 minutes)), or abolishing it entirely
for some variety of cases (See, e.g., 8 m C R R. 34-4) indicates, objectively, that oral argument is only rarely as significant as the written brief. The subjective, anecdotal reports of
appellate judges confirm this.
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counsel. These differences make the wholesale adoption of the
StrickZand standard on appeal inappropriate.

First, unlike trial representation, which is focused on development
of the facts, an appeal must be based on the record of proceedings
below. As a result, the input fiom the client is much more limited than
it is at trial. In addition, at least as compared with trial counsel, none
of appellate counsel's duties need be performed under time pressure
and thus are not entitled to the same amount of deference as those
decisions of trial counsel that must necessarily be made quickly.
Moreover, unlike the relief sought based on ineffectiveness of trial
counsel - reversal of a conviction (or habeas grant) and a new trial
- the relief sought for ineffectiveness of appellate counsel is a reopening of a previously decided appeal or the granting of an appeal
that was improperly forfeited initially."' That relief requires substantially fewer judicial resources and is substantially less damaging to the
finality of criminal judgments.
In addition, because in many cases the facts upon which appellate
counsel's decisions are made appear in the trial record, claims of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel can be, and frequently are, resolved
without hearings or with abbreviated hearings.231 Even where the
claimed ineffectiveness arises from failure to raise an issue, or where a
claim is litigated on federal habeas in the district court, courts generally do not hold extensive hearings to determine why counsel did not
raise an omitted issue because the reason is obvious from the record
itself and frorr~examination of the relative merits of the raised &d
unraised
Again, this is a function of the lesser importance

230. Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775 (llth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009
(1988), overruled on other groundr by Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1494 (llth Cir.
1986).
231. See, e.g., Luke v. Iowa, 465 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1990) (all issues resolved on
record, including failure to raise issue); Abdunahman v. Henderson, 897 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.
1990) (issue of failure to raise issue resolved on the record); Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439
(3d Cir. 1987) (issue of prejudice resolved on the record), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 979
(1988); Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1986).
232. Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (district court was not required to hold hearing
to determine why appellate counsel did not raise a specific issue, but must examine the trial
record and the appellate brief). Even if a hearing is required, given the intrinsic irrelevance
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of the facts on appeal than at trial. Thus, resolution of a claim of ineffective appellate counsel is easier and more efficient than resolution of
a claim of ineffective trial counsel.
Moreover, when a court reviews a claim of ineffectiveness of trial
counsel, it must determine the effect of lawyer incompetence on a jury
that is no longer available. Such a court must speak in terms of probabilities, as the Strickland standard requires?33 This fact, combined
with the sanctity of jury verdicts, means that convictions are reversed
only when it is sufficiently likely that the result is unreliable.234
Where ineffectiveness of appellate counsel is concerned, however, the
probability of unreliability is not as important because the state appellate court that would have considered the effectively presented appeal
remains available to do so on remand and without disturbing the underlying criminal conviction.
Moreover, as noted above$' where ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel claims are adjudicated on federal habeas corpus, the probability
analysis forces the federal court to predict or second-guess the state
court's evaluation of the merits of an appeal. This is an inappropriately
intrusive role under our system of federalism and one that is entirely
unnecessary because the state appellate court is l l l y available to consider the merits of the case.
Indeed, the resolution of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claims
requires fewer judicial resources than resolution of ineffectiveness of
trial counsel claims. In support of an application for relief based on
of the facts of a given case to appellate counsel's representation (see supra Part IV.A.2. (the
focus being on the record and existing state law)), such a hearing would still be less bnrdensome than one involving ineffectiveness of trial counsel,
233. Strickland 466 U.S. at 694. See supra text accompanying note 58.
234. Indeed, it is simply unrealistic to pretend that the appellate court does not do
precisely that in determining the ineffectiveness claim itself. Analysis of the case law makes
clear that the merit of the issues left unraised or treated deficiently is the linchpin of every
effectiveness question. See Parton v. Wyrick, 704 F.2d 415, 416 (8th Cir. 1983) (no ineffectiveness unless the issue omitted by appellate counsel "had arguable merif'); Bransford v.
Brown, 806 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1986) (failure to notice missing jury instructions and other
proceedings not ineffectiveness under Strickland because no showing that transcripts would
have revealed reversible error and where trial counsel apparently never indicated they would
reveal error), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1056 (1987).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 198-203.
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ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, the applicant generally submits a
brief that cures the deficiency that occurred when the appeal was originally heard. For example, if the claim is that an issue was.ignored,
that issue will be fully briefed; if the claim is that the brief was deficient, a competent brief will be filed. By doing this, the applicant can
show the court not only what kind of job effective counsel would have
performed (and compare it to what had been filed before); she can also
establish the merit of the appeal and can convince the court that little
time and expense will be required to resolve the case on the merits.
Thus, as far as remedy is concerned, all that a court need do to cure
the deprivation of effective counsel is to vacate the appellate judgment,
reopen the appeal, permit the virtually completed briefs to be filed, and
allow the case to be decided, or even decide the case on the meri t ~ . ' This
~ ~ takes very little additional time or effort and conserves
valuable judicial reso~rces.~~'
Similarly, the appropriate remedy for denial of effective assistance
of counsel on appeal that results in the total loss of the right to appeal
is to remand the case for resentencing so that a timely notice of appeal
can be filed238or to permit the filing of an untimely notice of appeal.ug After the notice of appeal is filed, the case is placed back on
the appellate court's calendar for full briefing and arg~ment.'~'
Thus, a fuiding of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel does not
have the dire consequences for finality that so concerned the Strickland
Court. A criminal conviction is not necessarily overturned, as it must
always be when trial counsel is found to have been constitutionally
ineffective. The prosecution is not put to the difficult task of proving
236. See, e.g., People v. Rutter, 1994 WL 521923 (N.Y.App. Div. First Dep't, Sept.
22, 1994) (on corafiz nobis application in the intermediate appellate court, conviction reversed and case remanded for a new trial).
237. Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d at 646 (in determining whether decision not to raise a
given issue was stratc:gic, the "district court should be guided by defendant's carefbl presentation of those issues which allegedly should have been raised on appeal, with accompanying
citations to the trial record").
238. See, e.g., Morgan v. Zanf 743 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Gipson, 985 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1993).
239. See, e.g., Bell v. Lockhart, 795 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1986); Lofton v. Whitley, 905
F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1990).
240. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 757 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Ark. 1988).
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guilt again, perhaps years after the crime. Rather,.the prosecution must
simply respond to a brief filed by a constitutionally adequate attorney,
and the state courts must entertain a properly perfected appeal.

A. Defining Reasonable Competence of Appellate Counsel
1. Securing Access to Appeal
As discussed above, in cases where an ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel claim arises out of counsel's failure to protect a defendant's
access to an appeal as of right, the courts have employed Strickland's
reasonable competence standard but have not r e q ~ e da showing of
prejudice.241This is the proper standard. As in other right to counsel
cases in which prejudice is presumed - cases involving absence of
counsel242or conflicts of
- the difficult burden of determining prejudice from denial of appeal justifies a finding of prejudice
per se. Moreover, because a defendant seeking relief in such a case
must establish that he intended to appeal and relied on his attorney to
do so, there is no case in which the failure to take an appeal will be
strategic. In addition, the remedy for deprivation of access to appeal is
simple and efficient - an appeal is granted, either by ordering a pro
forma resentence to start the time to appeal running
or by
granting permission to file a late notice of appeal.245No unfairness is
created for the prosecution since the appeal is based entirely on the

241. See supra Part 1II.B.
242. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422
U.S. 853 (1975); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961).
243. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (prejudice presumed under
Strickland if defendant demonstrates (1) actual conflict, and (2) that such conflict adversely
affected his lawyer's performance); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783 (1987) (same).
244. See supra note 238.
245. See supra notes 239-40.
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transcript.246111 denial-of-access cases, therefore, the courts need not
review counseEYsperformance with deference.
2. Pc:rfection of Appeal

As to claims of ineffectiveness based on inadequate preparation of
the appellate briefs, Strickland's "reasonable competence" standard247
is appropriate but must be defined to require the reasonable performance of appellate skills. That is, in addition to protecting the
defendant's right to appeal, every appellate lawyer must (1) secure and
read essential portions of the record; (2) accurately set out the facts
with supporting citations to the record; (3) research the applicable law;
(4) use relevant and persuasive authority; (5) select strategically among
the issues presented, considering the strength of authority, the facts,
and the standard and scope of review;248and (6) apply the law to the
facts of the case.
Although the Strickland court declined to formulate a "checklist
for judicial eviiluation of attorney perf~rmance,'"~~
the functional differences between trial and appellate counsel justify such an approach
here.'" Moreover, there is no justification for Strickland's highly deferential standard of review when applied to appellate counsel's performance. Like the failure to protect a client's access to the appellate
courts, the fail~ueto perform the above basic duties can never be considered a strategic decision.251
The reasons underlying Strickland's reluctance to formulate a
checklist simpljr do not apply in the appellate context. First, unlike the

246. In the m: case in which the transcript may be unavailable, proceedings can be
held to reconstruct what occurred, as they would be in any case in which essential portions
of the record are missing.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
248. See discus:iion infra Part V.A.3.
249. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
250. See discussion supra Part 1V.A.
251. As demonstrated above, while many courts have noted that the involvement of the
appellate court in reviewing the record and in inquiring into possible issues might justify a
more relaxed perfomlance standard for ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claims, analytically and realistically, such judicial involvement is irrelevant.
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trial context, as to which the Strickland Court held that, "[nlo particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take
account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the
range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant,"252 the range of legitimate strategic possibilities on appeal
is limited. Again, unlike trial decisions, changes in the facts only marginally affect the necessity or scope of appellate counsel's decisions.
Nor would mandating the performance of these skills "interfere
with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict
the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions"253
or "distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy
of the defendant's cause."z4 There is simply no conceivable appellate
context in which the listed skills are not required, and consequently,
"there can be no strategic choice that renders such [skills] unneces~ary."~"These requirements are 'not likely to create a minimum stand&d that would become the norm or to result in a "proliferation
of
ineffectiveness challenges."256Simply put, most lawyers perform these
basic functions.
Moreover, in marked contrast to trial counsel's performance, the
context and record on which all of these decisions are made is fully
available to a court reviewing appellate counsel's performance. Thus,
appellate attorney performance is not entitled to the same deference as
trial counsel performance, and the litigation of appellate ineffectiveness
claims should be considerably less complicated and more efficient than
trial ineffectiveness claims. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Gray v.
GreerYz7an appeal is based on the record and the case law. All of
the facts that inform counsel's decisions are contained in the trial record; all of the law upon which counsel's decisions are based is avail-

252. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.
253. Id. at 689.
254. Id.
255. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680. Because of this, there is no danger of creating a
minimum standard that would become the norm. Every appeal must be handled in this way.
In fact, if every appellate lawyer were required to undertake the above enumerated steps, the
standard of representation would improve.
256. Id. at 690.
257. Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1986).
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able to the
Thus, there is no reason to defer to trial counsel,
to presume reasonable competence, or to hold extensive hearings.
It also is relevant that appellate counsel's duties are not significantly affected in any way by the client's participation. Unlike the
client's centrdl role at trial,259the role of the client in perfecting the
appeal typically is limited. Indeed, while retained appellate lawyers
may solicit the client's input or review in drafting the brief, few expect substantial input fiom non-lawyer clients. Ordinarily, assigned or
legal aid lawyers, who have large caseloads, do not ask their clients to
review drafts of their briefs, give them little time to review a draft
sent largely as a courtesy, or simply send the client the final version of
the brief when it is filed with the court.260Indeed, assigned counsel
plans may not authorize funds to have the transcript copied for a
client's review. This may or may not foster good attorney-client relations, but it reflects two realities of the appellate forum: clients rarely
have anything helpful to contribute to brief writing. In light of that,
allowing time and money to insure their input can substantially delay
the hearing of the appealz6' and contribute substantially - but unnecessarily - to an appellate lawyer's workload. Again, a hearing addressed to the client's contribution is likely to be brief, if any is required, and no substantial appellate deference is warranted.
3. Selection of Issues

While the selection of issues is clearly
that consideration should not completely insulate the process from reviewaZb3
AS in
258. Id
259. See discussion supra Part 1V.A.I.
260. This infonnation comes fiom seventeen years of appellate practice, including representing criminal derendants on appeal, screening applications for admission to an indigent
defendant's appellate: panel, and teaching criminal appellate practice to law students.
261. In cases where an indigent defendant-appellant requests a copy of his trial transcript, appellate counsel must forward her copy after the brief is completed. If the client
wishes to file a supplemental. brief he must request court permission to do so. However, the
case will not be cillendared for argument until the supplemental brief and transcript are
filed.
262. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
263. The court in Gray, 800 F.2d at 646, stated: "Were it legitimate to dismiss a claim
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Strickland, "[i]nformed decision[s] based on reasonable professional
judgment[^]'^^ will not support a claim of ineffectiveness." In determining whether a reasonable professional judgment is involved in the
selection of issues on appeal, the standard should be whether the neglected issue has sufficient merit, in light of the other available issues,
that reasonably competent counsel would have pursued it. Sufficient
merit should be determined in light of the strength of authority, the
facts, the standard of review, and the scope of review. The standard
should not be the standard currently applied in reality by the courts,
i. e., whether counsel omitted a clear and winning i~sue.2~'
Several courts presently do require a comparative analysis of the
issues that were raised and the issues that were not raised.266If the
reviewing court determines that the omitted issue or issues are of sufficient merit that a reasonably competent lawyer would have raised them
either in addition to or rather than the issues raised, the presumption of
effectiveness of counsel should be 0vercorne.2~'

of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal solely because we found it improper to review
appellate counsel's choice of issues, the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal
would be worthless."
264. Griffm v. Aiken, 775 F.2d 1226, 1235 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1007 (1986).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 183-86.
266. See, e.g., Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, No. 932007, 1994 WL 273742 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994).
267. Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986). As the court in Gray explained:
When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on failure to raise viable issues, the district court must examine the trial court record to determine
whether appellate counsel failed to present significant and obvious issues on appeal.
Significant issues which could have been raised should then be compared to those
which were raised. Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than
those presented, "will" the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.
Gray, 800 F.2d at 646. This standard would avoid the problem of habeas corpus review of
claims of ineffectiveness of state appellate counsel. It may well be that a federal court will
reach a different conclusion on the merits of an unraised state law claim than would a state
appellate court considering that same claim on appeal. Thus, meritorious state law claims
would never be entertained because of the federal court's perception 'of its strength. That
sort of federal interference in state law proceedings should be avoided.
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Again, as with the duty to protect access to appeal and,the duty to
effectively perfect the appeal, there is no reason for appellate deference. All of the reasons for non-deferential review discussed above
with respect to appellate counsel's other duties apply here. Whether a
defendant-appellant has retained his lawyer or had a lawyer assigned to
him, he has little role in selecting the issues in practice.268And under
indigent clients who are assigned counsel have no
Jones v. Barr~es:~~
constitutional right to decide which issues should be raised.270
Finally, the assertion that an appellate court's independent review
of the record ought to result in a relaxed performance standard for appellate counsel has properly been rejected in several contexts. Most
fundamentally, the Supreme Court in Anders v. CaliJornid7' explained that once an appellate court finds nonfrivolous issues on appeal
~ Court
it must appoint an attorney.272Later, in Evitts v. L u ~ e y ; ~the
acknowledged:
In bringing an appeal as of right from his conviction, a criminal defendant
is attempting t o demonstrate that the conviction, with its consequent drastic
loss of liberty, is unlawful. To prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant
must face an adversary proceeding that - like a trial - is governed by
intricate rules that to a layperson would be hopelessly forbidding. An
unrepresented appellant - like an unrepresented defendant at trial
unable to protect the vital interests at stake.274

- is

268. It is certainly almost impossible to imagine any case in which a client would
request that an issue identified by his lawyer not be raised.
269. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
270. Id. at 751.
271. 386 U.S. 738 (1966).
272. Id. at 744.
273. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
274. Id. at 395. See also Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1985), where
the court found coimsel's representation on appeal in a death penalty case to be ineffective.
There, the court stated:
It is true that we have imposed upon ourselves the duty to independently examine
each death penalty case. However, we will be the first to agree that our judicially
neutral review of so many death cases, many with records running to the thousands
of pages, is no substitute for the carefil, partisan scrutiny of a zealous advocate. It
is the unique role of that advocate to discover and highlight possible error and to
present it to the court, both in writing and orally, in such a manner designed to
persuade the court of the gravity of the alleged deviations from due process.
Wilson, 474 So. 2d at 1165.
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Most recently, in Penson v.
the Court held that a court's
independent review of the record after counsel's motion to withdraw
had been granted was not sufficient to focus the court's attention on
the arguable claims, even though the court's review included the briefs
filed by the co-defendants and actually resulted in reversal in part of
the defendant's conviction.276In so holding, the Court stated:
The need for forceful advocacy does not come to an abrupt halt as the
legal proceeding moves from the trial to appellate stage. Both stages of
the prosecution, although perhaps involving unique legal skills, require
careful advocacy to ensure that rights are not forgone and that substantial
legal and factual arguments are not inadvertently passed over . . . . [T'Jhe
fundamental importance of the assistance of counsel does not cease as the
prosecutorial process moves from the trial to the appellate stage . . . .277

B. No Prejudice Requirement

Our major departure fiom the Strickland standard is the rejection
of a requirement of prejudice. There is simply no justification for a
separate prejudice requirement in evaluating ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel claims.
First, as previously discussed,27' requiring an independent showing of prejudice alters the evaluation of the attorney's performance by
"importing into the assessment of competency the 'reasonable
probability' language of the prejudice inquiry.'"79 Also, as noted
above, the question of reasonable competence depends largely on
275. 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
276. Id. at 89.
277. Id. at 85, 88. The Eleventh Circuit has also noted:
A brief sets forth a partisan position and contains legal reasoning and authority
supporting the defendant's position. The mere fact that appellate courts are obligated to review the record for errors cannot be considered a substitute for the legal
reasoning and authority typically found in a brief.
Mylar v. Alabama, 671 F.2d 1299, 1302 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229
(1983).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 187-97.
279. Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d at 810 (Newrnan, J., dissenting). See supra notes 18797 and accompanying text
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whether an ignored issue had sufficient merit, in light of the other
available issues, so that reasonably competent counsel would have
pursued it.*'' The presence of an actual prejudice requirement distorts
the evaluatio~i of performance so that the standard is no longer
Strickland's "reasonable competence.'"''
Moreover, when ineffectiveness of state appellate counsel is litigated on federal habeas corpus, the presence of a "reasonable probability"
of success requirement requires a federal habeas court to second guess
or predict the outcome of state issues allegedly omitted by state appellate counsel, allowing too much federal intrusion into the state
TO the extent that ineffectiveness of appellate counsel
claims are litigated on direct appeal or by motion in an appellate court,
the "reasonable probability" of success standard is at least unnecessary,
because the appellate court considering the claim is present to resolve
the issues on appeal. The concept of "reasonable probability" of a
different result makes sense only when a reviewing court is trying to
determine the effect of attorney incompetence on a jury that is no
longer available. There is no need to engage in this type of probability
analysis when one appellate panel of a given court is determining the
effect of attorney incompetence on another of its panels. Moreover, as
many claims of ineffectiveness based on failure to
discussed abo~e,2'~
raise an issue are presented on habeas corpus. There, the federal court
must determine de novo the merits of state law issues, an intrusive
practice that clearly runs counter to the Court's current conception of
federali~rn.~'~

280. See discussion supra Part IILC.3.
281. As Judge Newman stated:
Since Strickland used "reasonable probability" to measure the likelihood that a trial
outcome would have been different (in order to assess prejudice from lawyering
already determined to be deficient) it is ill-advised to press this same standard into
service for the different task of determining whether counsel's performance was
deficient.
Claudio, 982 F.2d at 810 (Newman, J., dissenting).
282. See supra notes 198-203.
283. See supra notes 198-203.
284. Again, in the words of Judge Newman:
By invoking in the appellate context the "reasonable probability of affecting the
outcome" standard from the trial context, the majority creates the risk, no doubt
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The adjudication of a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel is
also more burdensome and expensive than adjudication of a claim of
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. Largely because it is so fact-bound
and involves so many decisions that are presumptively strategic, challenges to the effectiveness of trial counsel are held in a trial level
forum, require hearings and findings of fact to determine what counsel
knew, what facts he relied on, and what the client told him. Such
proceedings can be extensive and costly.
In contrast, constitutional claims of ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel are generally litigated on federal habeas corpus285and generally do not involve hearings.286If a hearing is required, it is likely to
be relatively brief and to involve relatively clean-cut issues.
The remedy for denial of effective assistance of appellate counsel

- a new appeal - has a much less substantial effect on the finality
of judgments than the remedy for denial of effective assistance of trial
counsel - a new trial. Much of the reluctance to vacate a jury verdict
that underlies the "reasonable probability" standard stems in large measure from the expensive and burdensome result - a new trial. A finding of appellate ineffectiveness requires no more than an additional
brief, and generally not even that. Most applications for relief based on
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel are accompanied by precisely the

inadvertently, that some defendants will be denied an opportunity to have presented
to state courts some state law issues that reasonably competent counsel would have
asserted and that might, after issuance of a conditional writ, prove successfil in
state court, but that might not be thought by a federal habeas court to have a
"reasonable probability of affecting the outcome." In other words, appellate counsel
might, in some instances, be found to have performed below the level of reasonable competence, even though the habeas court is not persuaded that the omitted
issue is a likely winner. In a case like the pending one, where the omitted claim
is based on state law, the test should be simply whether the claim had sufficient
merit, in view of the other available issues, that reasonably competent counsel
would pursue it; the habeas court's prediction that the state law claim would probably be meritorious in state court is wholly unnecessary and, indeed, inappropriate
for a federal court.
Claudio, 982 F.2d at 810.
285. See, e.g., Schwander v. Blackbum, 750 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985); Bransford v.
Brown, 806 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1986); Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125 (11th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 116 (1991).
286. See supra notes 235-40.
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kind of brief that properly should have been filed initially.287Indeed,
it is hard to imagine how such an application could succeed without
the applicant pointing out precisely what issues should have been raised
or precisely how an effective brief would have been written. To the
extent that this practice is not followed in a given court, it could be
required by local rule or case law, as it has been in the Anders context.288
Finally, our proposed standard would not open the floodgates of
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claims. The re-defined reasonable
competence test by definition reflects what most appellate attorneys already do. Strategic decisions, properly and reasonably made, will continue to be upheld. And the absence of a prejudice requirement will
both return .the habeas courts to their proper, lesszintrusive role and
restore the "reasonableness" to Strickland's reasonable competence
standard as applied in the appellate context. Finally, to the extent that
any additional claims do result, the quick and efficient resolution of
such claims should not impose a substantial burden on the courts.

VI. . CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has yet to articulate the standard for judging
claims of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. In that vacuum, the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted the standard set
forth in Strickland v. Washington289for judging claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. All but one of the courts of appeals adopted
Strickland without discussion or analysis.290The only articulated rea287. Gray,XOO F.2d at 646. In Gray, the court advised that:
m h e determination of whether the decision [not to raise certain issues on appeal]
was strategic requires an examination of the trial record. In conducting such an
examination, the district court should be guided by defendant's careful presentation
of those issues which allegedly should have been raised on appeal, with accompanying citations to the trial record.

Id
288. IST CIF, R. 46.4(~);2D CIR. R. 4(B); 4TH CIR. L0.P. 46.2; 5TH CIR.APP. III(3);
61-14 CIR. R. 12(D); 7TH CIR.R. 4; ~ T HC~R.
APP. II(II)(I); IOTH CIR.R. 46.4.2; 1 ITH CIR.
R. 46-I(D).
289. 466 U.!S. 668 (1984).
290. See dis~:ussionsupra Part 1II.B.
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soning on the subject - fiom the Ninth Circuit - is both inadequate
and wrong. The Supreme Court should define the standard for judging
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claims. In the process, it should
state definitively whether its Sfrickland standard applies, and if so, how
it applies. In doing so, the Court must identify the relevant differences
between the role of trial counsel and the trial forum fiom the role of
appellate counsel and the appellate forum. The Court must also analyze
the fuil scope of the right to effective assistance of appellate counsel,
including the constitutional, common la+ procedural, and practical
issues discussed in this article. No court has yet taken either of these
steps. As we have done here, the Court should provide a uniform standard for judging ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claims that adopts
but redefines Strickland's "reasonable competence~~
standard to fit the
role of appellate counsel and the appellate fonun, and that rejects
Strickland s prejudice requirement.
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